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ABSTRACT OF THESIS
MEDICAID MANAGED CARE FOR THOSE WITH DISABILITY:
ANALYSIS WITH IMPLICATIONS FOR MINI\ESOTA'S
DEMONSTRATION PROJECT FOR PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES
Focus of Study: Policy Analysis
Darrin P. Helt
AUGSBURG COLLEGE MI}.INEAPOLIS, MINNESOTA
July, 1998
Many states have recently begun enrolling Medicaid beneficiaries with
disabilities into prepaid managed care plans. The purpose of this study was to
analyze various state programs in terms of reconciling access to quality health care
services for the enrollee and the financial viability for both govemment entities and
contracted health care plans with future policy implications for Minnesota's program
for those with disabilities, the Demonstration Project for People with Disabilities
(DPPD). This study involved the survey of published literature of existing state
Medicaid managed care programs specifically serving those with disabilities. While
the future prognosis is unclear, evidence shows that this group has service needs
different from other populations. The inclusion of designated consumer advocates
and consensus building stakeholder meetings at all levels of programming was cited
as most effective amongst state programs. Given Minnesota's proposed policy
structures, DPPD appears promising, however, policy recommendations are provided.
1.) Define medical necessity. 2.) Adopt risk sharing through a risk corridor. 3.) Use
inclusive evaluation research. And 4.) Maintain and ensure social responsibiliry.
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CHAPTER ONE
Introduction
The amount of money this nation spends on health care is curently 13.6
percent of our nation's Gross National Product, and by 1995, health care inflation had
reached twice that of total economic inflation (Levit,Lazerfry, and Braden, 1996).
However, in 1996, health care inflation most recently has been stalled, growing by
only three percentage points, and appear to be holding steady in 1997 (U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services, National Institutes of Health, and
National Institutes of Mental Health, I99l; as cited in Hall, Edgar, & Flynn,1997).
This phenomenon has largely been attributed to various oomanaged care techniques",
used first by employer health plans, and more recently by government entities. The
primary attraction of managed care plans has been the anticipated cost savings to the
payer of health care services, while maintaining the promise of access to quality of
services to the enrollee of health care plans, through increased organizational
efficiencies employed by the health care provider (Cornelius, 1994; Reilly & Broyles,
1992; Shouldice, 1 993).
Currently, all but a handful of states have implemented some form of public
managed health care for at least part of their Medicaid enrollees. Medicaid, the
publicly financed health care program for the poor and disabled, is one of the largest
and fastest growing expenditures for both federal and state govemments,
encompassing approximately 20 percent of states' budgets (Bloom, 1997). Sixteen
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states and the District of Columbia have enrolled Medicaid beneficiaries with severe
disabilities into managed care programs (Health Care Financing Administration
IHCFA] ,1997a).
Puroose of the Studv
-
This study is an attempt to analyze state Medicaid managed care programs
across the country that have health plans serving beneficiaries with serious
disabilities. These plans are either specifically designed to serve those with
disabilities or have mechanisms for to allow those Medicaid beneficiaries with
disabilities to enroll in those states' general Medicaid managed care programs. This
policy analysis focuses on reconciling the benefits of states' Medicaid managed care
initiatives through the balancing of economic feasibility of financial risk-sharing
amongst some stakeholders (the state and private health plans) and access to quality
health care services for others (Medicaid recipients with disabilities enrolled in
managed care plans). This analysis will evaluate these various programs in terms of
their applicability to the state of Minnesota's demonstration project for its residents
with disabilities who are eligible for Medicaid. This demonstration project designed
to provide health care services for Medicaid beneficiaries with disabilities through a
prepaid managed care system is called the Demonstration Project for People with
Disabilities (DPPD).
2
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Context of the Studlz
The state of Minnesota's Department of Human Services (DHS) is currently in
the process of considering a system-wide paradigm conversion in its administration of
the state's Medicaid program. It is the stated intention of DHS to greatly alter the
financing and insurance reimbursement mechanisms of the state's Medicaid program,
termed, Medical Assistance. DHS has expressed a desire to move the states Medicaid
program away from the traditional fee-for-service (FFS) arrangement consisting of a
separate "market rate" charge from the heath care provider of services for each patient
visit and service or procedure rendered. They intend on progressing towards a
capitated managed care model in which care is provided under a fixed budget for each
person served. In this system, costs and services are "managed" through controlled
patient use of services and negotiated collective pricing rates between insurance payer
and health care provider (Youngs, Rosenthal, Defino, & Reichard, 1996).
Under the oversight of the Minnesota Legislafure, the Department of Human
Services has been developing the means to permanently move the state's health care
policy in the direction of a managed care model of financing and service delivery for
its Medicaid enrollees. Several options for a statewide Medicaid managed care
system were explored through demonstration projects throughout the state for its non-
disabled, non-elderly Medicaid populations. One of these demonstration models, the
Prepaid Medical Assistance Program (PMAP) has been adopted and has begun to be
imp lemented statewide.
The majoriry of Minnesota's Medicaid recipients will soon be covered through
PMAP; however, both elderly residents who are concurrently eligible for Medicaid
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and Medicare health care benefits, and those non-elderly Medicaid beneficiaries with
serious disabilities have been excluded from enrollment into PMAP. A demonstration
project is currently seeking to address the health care needs of the elderly "dually
eligible" Medicaid/Medicare beneflciaries, serving 4,000 enrollees in a program
called the Minnesota Long-Term Care Options Program (HCFA, 1997b). The
Demonstration Project for People with Disabilities has been developed by DHS to
coordinate and evaluate a prepaid managed health care system for the states Medicaid
beneficiaries with serious disabilities (MN DHS, 1997).
Although nearly two-thirds of states with Medicaid managed care plans for
those beneficiaries with disabilities do serve dually eligible enrollees, the scope of
this study focuses exclusively upon those programs that serve beneficiaries with
disabilities through Medicaid managed care plans only. The purpose of this research
is to find implications for Minnesota's Demonstration Project for People with
Disabilities (DPPD), and those programs studied will be those which most closely
resemble the population DPPD seeks to serve (HCFA, 1996b; MN DHS, 1996b).
Within the context of this study, Medicaid enrollees with disabilities are
defined and described as, "persons eligible for Medical Assistance [Medicaid]
because of a disability, specifically persons with physical, developmental, or
psychiatric disabilities" (Mh{ DHS, 1996). The term "managed care" throughout this
document shall remain, in all instances, those health care financing and delivery
systems that comply with the federal Health Care Financing Administration's
(HCFA) definition of "managed care entities". These "managed care entities" are
organizations whose services would be acceptable under Medicaid's managed care
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reimbursement guidelines. These accepted managed care organizations which are
recognized and designated by HCFA as "federally qualified" are Health Maintenance
Organizations (HMO's), Health Insuring Organizations (HIO's), and Primary Care
Case Management (PCCM), (HCFA, 1993). As noted by a U. S. General Accounting
Office ( 1996) report, "In general terms, managed care refers to a range of health care
services that use primary care practitioners to control and coordinate the delivery of
services" (p. 15). HMO's and HIO's are most often capitated orprepaid models that
involve a set fee per enrollee to provide (as is the case with HMO's) or arrange for (as
with HIO's) for a predetermined set of available services. The arrangement of PCCM
models are similar to traditional fee-for-service arrangements except that providers
receive a per capita fee to coordinate care, in addition to a fee for each service
performed (GAO,lgg6; HCFA, 1993).
Framework for Analysis
This analysis seeks to explore states' two primary challenges in the
administration of Medicaid managed care programs for those with serious disabilities:
appropriate access to health care services by beneficiaries; and providing adequate
services in a fiscally sound manner, with special implications for DPPD. Karger and
Stoesz's (1998) policy analysis framework has been selected to aid with the
examination of Medicaid managed care initiatives for people with disabilities. This
framework was selected because its scope of analysis includes the historical
background of the policy, description of the situation that necessitated the policy, the
description of the policy, and the analysis of the policy. However, the model goes
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beyond elementary cost-benefit style analysis to include considerations of the
feasibility of the policy on political, economic, and administrative means (Karger &
Stoesz, 1998).
Significance of the Study
Social workers are often primary service providers and advocates for
vulnerable and at-risk populations. Additionally, many social workers are employed
in the field of disabilities. They can be found in a variety of professional roles; as
case managers, therapists, residential and vocational counselors, and agency
administrators, just to name a few. Even when not employed in the field of
disabilities, social workers often have close contact with people who have disabilities,
or family members of those with disabilities; in family counseling agencies, in
medical providers, in schools or in legal settings, in almost all working environments
where social workers are employed. Social workers who prescribe the profession's
Code of Ethics are compelled to be knowledgeable about what are considered to be
progressive public social policies in serving people with disabilities.
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CHAPTER TWO
Review of the Relevant Literature
Managed care has greatly altered the scope and delivery of health care services
in the United States over the past 15 years (Bumer, Waldo, & McKusick, 1992). In
1984, 90 percent of all private health insurance plans in this country were traditional
fee-for-service plans; while managed care plans comprised merely 10 percent of the
health care market. It has been estimated that by the dawn of the twenty-first century,
these figure will be reversed (Burner, et al., 1992). According to the Group Health
Association of America (1993), rn 1992, there were 42 million Americans enrolled
with one or more of the nation's 550 private managed care organrzations. As of
Irlovember 1994, managed care enrollment had exceeded 50 million (cited in Keigher,
1995), and within two years enrollment reached 65 million enrollees Showstack,
Lurie, Leatherman, Fisher, & Inui, 1996). Currently, private managed care plans now
cover two-thirds of all privately insured people in this country (Karger & Stoesz,
r ees).
Manased Care Arransements
Managed care is an umbrella label for a system of complex related health
insurance plans. Managed care organizations have most often been illustrated and
explained by contrasting with what they are not, fee-for-service indemnity plans.
Fee-for-service plans refer to the traditional method of financing health care services,
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that is, paying a prescribed fee for each specific procedure or service provided
(Shouldice, 1993; Karger & Stoesz, 1998). By far most managed care organizations
are financed through fixed rate, i.e. capitated means (Shouldice, 1993). Under a
capitation system, providers (physicians/hospitals, etc.) negotiate a set advanced
payment for each enrollee irrespective of service use. However, the specific
organization of each managed care plan may vary greatly in terms of payer/provider
relationship, as well as the individual assumption of financial risk. Overall, health
care cost savings occur through actuarial liability management and utilization review
(i.e. risk proportional rate setting, and access restraint) mechanisms (Shouldice,
1993). Stated succinctly, "Managed care is seen as a way to help control...costs
because it discourages providers from providing unnecessary services and directs
beneficiaries to obtain care in the most cost-effective settings" (GAO, 1996, p. 15-
16). Hiratsuka (1990), albeit in a more cautionary tone, asserts that managed care
mechanisms reflect "attempts by the payer.. . to intervene in the patient/provider
relationship in order to control price and service use while maintaining quality and
assuring that care is rendered in the most appropriate setting" (p. 2-3).
Growth of Managed Care Systems
The widespread growth and emergence of managed care mechanisms have
largely been driven by anticipated health sare cost savings. These savings were to
have resulted from increased efflciencies, streamlined coordinated service plans, and
conscious limits placed upon service access (Cornelius, 1994 Keigher, 1995;
Shouldice, 1993). One of the most frequent rationales used in the promotion of
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managed care techniques has been the anticipated cost savings to the health care
payer while quality services are maintained (Cornelius, 1994; Reilly & Broyles, 1992;
Shouldice, 1993). However, this belief is not universally held. Miller and Luft's
1994 meta-analysis of outcome perforrnances of private managed care plans had quite
mixed results when compared to indemnity health plans. Their study found that while
managed care had significantly lower rates of hospitalization, elective procedures, and
diagnostic tests; the number and frequency of primary physician office visits and
spending on preventative and health education programs increased notably, and health
outcomes varied greatly. Miller and Luft called for greater in depth study of
individual plans and industry trends: "sfudies... need to determine what'works' in
managed care as oppose to whether managed care 'works' (1994, p. l5l8).
Two actuarial studies of private managed care employee benefit plans found
that no overall cost savings occurred. Peat Marwick KPMG and Foster Higgins
Consulting both established that apparent savings resulted in mere cost shifting
between health eare payers, from employers to enrollees. Movement away from
traditional indemnity towards managed care plans resulted on average in both higher
enrollee premiums and their greater financial responsibility for medical bills (cited in
Keigher, 1995).
In 1994, The U. S. Congressional Budget Office found in their analysis of the
private managed care industry that moderate cost savings that do occur appear to be
the result of the elimination of unnecessary care screened out by the organizations'
gatekeeping functions. Also, apparent reductions in enrollee costs have often been
overstated as managed care plans typically have "healthier" memberships. This lack
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of experience adds to the diligence required as health care organrzations move
towards enrolling public health plans' beneficiaries with serious disabilities.
Additionally, nearly all traditional indemnity health insurers have adopted certain
managed care mechanisms in order to maintain market competitiveness. As a result,
a CBO (1994) memorandum noted that managed care plans' vast stated market
advantage has steadily decreased (CBO, 1,994; Karger & Stoesz, 1998).
The growth of managed care within public health plans has paralleled that of
the private health care industry. The state of Washington began contracting with a
private managed care plan (Group Health of Puget Sound) in 1970. That same year
New York Cify began enrolling some of its Medicaid beneficiaries into a "quasi-
HMO" health plan called the Health Insurance Plan of Greater Irlew York (Tobler &
Gordon, 1996). However, the past five years have the most rapid promulgation of
public managed care plans. Since 1993, the number of managed care enrollees from
public health care plans has increased considerably (Health Care Financing
Administration, L997a). The Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA), which
administers the two largest public health care plans, Medicare and Medicaid, is
currently by far the largest purchaser of managed care services in the country, with
about 19 million beneficiaries of the approximately 65 million Americans enrolled in
managed care plans (HCFA, 1997a; Voelker,1997).
Medicare is the federal health insurance program for persons aged 65 and
over, and persons with disabilities of any age with a significant work history. While
Medicaid, on the other hand, is financed jointly by the federal government and
individual states for children and adults of low income, as well as those with
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disabilities without a significant work history (HCFA, 1996a1' Liska, 1997). Medicare
is a health insurance plan (albeit, a federally subsidized insurance program), whereas,
Medicaid is a needs based health aid program. As stated above, Medicare is
administrated federally by HCFA, and Medicare beneficiaries' participation in
managed care plans is strictly voluntary. Beneficiaries may enroll or disenroll in a
Medicare managed care plan for any reason with simply a 30-day notice. Medicaid
managed care programs, however, are far more complex. Medicaid is a federal and
state health care financing partnership. Within federal guidelines, states have
considerable flexibility determining eligibility, scope of service, payment structures,
and rate setting. Additionally, each state's enrollment criteria may be mandatory,
voluntary within the state's general plan, or a specialized mandatory or voluntary
program targeted to a sub-population of Medicaid beneficiaries, i.e. those with a
disabiliry. This aspect of the Medicaid program creates, essentially, over one hundred
different, publicly financed health care programs across the country (GAO, 1996
HCFA, 1997a; Liska, 1997).
Dual Eligibility for Medicaid and Medicare
It has been estimated that up to one-third of all Medicaid beneflciaries with
disabilities across the country are additionally eligible for Medicare coverage (GAO,
1996). There are, however, several barriers that exist to providing coordinated
managed health care services for those "dually eligible" beneficiaries. Whereas state
Medicaid programs enjoy considerable flexibility in the design of managed care
programs, Medicare rules permit little such freedom. "The Medicare statue, in
Augsfl'r*rg il*ir*gm l-lbrnry
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particular, contains a number of provisions that cannot be waived and that directly
affect basic features of Medicaid prepaid care" (GAO, 1996, p. 18). For example,
Medicare guidelines dictate that participating health plans have no more than 50
percent publicly financed enrollees, while Medicaid allows for up to 75 percent
publicly insured enrollees (GAO,1996). Additionally, Master & Tanguchi, (1996)
noted that many managed care plans have been wary to enroll dually eligible
beneficiaries due to the threat of pushing the percentage of public enrollees above 50
percent, which would prevent enrollment of any Medicare beneflciary in those plans.
Current Medicaid spending has grown to a rate ten times its level in I 97 5. By
1992, annual spending had exceeded the $120 billion mark, and comprised overhalf
of all new revenues in many states. In the 10 years between 1985 and 1995, Medicaid
expenditures tripled (GAO, 1996). Recent GAO projections predict expenditures to
double again by 2005, although these projections have been disputed by Holahan &
Liska ( 1997) who contend that spending will hold relatively flat, excluding inflation,
and may even begin to decline with expanded reliance on managed care techniques.
Currently, Medicaid provides health care coverage for more than 35 million people,
and the cost of this health care coverage totals nearly $ 166 billion a year. This
represents an increase of more than 3 times the cost of Medisaid expenditures during
the late 1980's, and nearly seven times its level of $25.7 billion in 1980 (Karger &
Stoesz, 1998). During the fouryears between 1988 and 1992 Medicaid spending grew
at a rate of 22 percent per year from $53.5 billion to $120 billion, prompting many
states to critically evaluate their health care spending (Holahan & Liska, 1997). In
1997, Medicaid spending, in excess of $159 billion, comprised approximately 20
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percent of states' budgets (Bloom , 1997). A 1996 GAO report noted that, "Faced
with rising Medicaid expenditures- the fastest growing portion of most state budgets-
many states have begun to incorporate managed care into their service delivery
approach" (p. l5).
Over the past decade, many state, county, and municipal governments across
the country have increasingly begun to contract with existing managed care
organtzations, or have chosen to establish public managed care entities of their own to
provide health care services to low-income, elderly, and disabled Medicaid
beneficiaries. There are several factors that have compelled public policy makers to
explore capitated Medicaid managed care. First, because of the increasing need for
government agencies to be more financially accountable and cost restrictive in a time
of fiscal devolution and renewed federalism. Secondly, in order to ensure adequate
access to health care services for an increasing (and until quite recently rapidly
increasing) Medicaid population. Additionally, public pressure has been placed upon
govemments to increase efficiencies as a result of the popularity of managed care
techniques, and the public's desire to shift financial risk from the payer (e.9. state
governments) to the provider (e.9. the physician/physician association). And finally,
the public perception that better, more cost-effective methods are possible, however,
they have not been realized through Medicaid's traditional financing system
(Dangerfield & Betit, 1993).
HCFA has indicated that "implementation of managed care within state
Medicaid programs directly involve several entities: Medicaid recipients, managed
care organizations, state Medicaid agencies, and the federal govemment" (1996a, p.
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5). At the same time a GAO (1996) report concurred with a similar assessment of key
participant groups involved, that "beneficiaries, who are concerned about adequate
access to quality carc; the managed care plans, which are concerned about not
assuming inappropriate or excessive financial risk; and the states and federal
govemment, which are Goncerned about protecting the interests of both beneficiaries
and taxpayers" (p. 12).
At this time, every state, with the exceptions of Alaska and Vermont offer
some form of Medicaid managed care (HCFA, 1997b Voelker,1997). Medicaid
managed care is intended to be less expensive than traditional fee-for-service
mechanisms because it presumably would eliminate the incentive for health care
plans to provide unnecessary or needlessly expensive services in order to maximize
revenues. [Jnder a managed care model, a health care provider negotiates to provide
medical seruices for a specified amount per person, usually paid to the provider in
advance. For this reason, Medicaid managed care is sometimes referued to in the
literature as Prepaid Medicaid.
Medicaid managed care is growing faster than Medicare managed care. By
1997, nearly 5 million Medicare beneficiaries were enrolled in one of the 336
participating managed care plans, accounting for 13 percent of the total population of
about 38 million Medicare recipients. While at the same time, of the 33 million
Medicaid beneficiaries, more than l3 million were enrolled in a managed health care
plan totaling over 40 percent of all Medicaid recipients. Within the past four years,
HCFA has seen its Medicare enrollment in managed care plans increase 108 percent;
however, Medicaid managed care enrollment at this same time increased more
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drastically, by over 170 percent, including a 33 percent increase in 1995 alone
(HCFA, 1997a).
Medicaid beneficiaries have historically enjoyed the freedom to select among
any participating provider who accepted Medicaid. This freedom was thought to
ensure high quality of services because beneficiaries were free to leave any provider
that they determined was inadequate or unsatisfactory in any way. A tradeoff exists
in that Medicaid managed care may assure access to services, at the risk of losing the
freedom to choose or switch providers.
When implementing Medicaid managed care, states have three program design
options. States may contract with any managed health care provider as long as
enrollment is voluntary, beneficiaries may disenroll at any time, and that enrollment is
limited to no more than 75 percent public Medicare & Medicaid enrollees. Aside
from this option, states may still enroll Medicaid beneficiaries into managed care
plans, however states must obtain federal approval to require enrollment or restrict
beneficiaries' freedom to choose providers. This approval is called a waiver and is
designed to ensure that everyone who is eligible for Medicaid health care services has
reasonable access to it. Federal waivers allow HCFA to waive certain statutory
requirements and to allow states the abiliff to adapt their health care delivery systems.
These two waivers are named after the sections of the Social Security Act which
authorize their use. Program, or Section 1915(b), waivers allow states to mandate
enrollment into managed care plans. To obtain a 1915(b) waiver a state must
demonstrate the capacity to effectively serve the needs of Medicaid beneficiaries who
will enrolled in the health plan. Demonstration, or Section 1115, waivers allow states
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to test new approaches to new Medicaid service delivery or eligibility, often allowing
for dynamic sweeping system changes. They are generally non-renewable beyond the
initial scope of the demonstration. Demonstration waivers allow states to provide
services in a prepaid managed eare system to some beneficiaries, while keeping
others in a traditional fee-for-service system (GAO, 1996). Essock and Goldman
(1995) remarked that, *'In an effort to control costs, minimize risks, and contract out
what they do poorly themselves, many states are opting for a wide variety of .. .health
care services." (p.43).
Medicaid managed care now accounts for over 40 percent of all Medicaid
enrollees, nearly 400 percent increase since 1992 (HCFA, 1997). However, until
quite recently, most states' expedience with administering Medicaid managed care
programs have served low-income families, Temporary Aid to Families in Need
(TANF) recipients, former Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC)
recipients, and their families, as well as other Medicaid beneficiaries that closely
resemble most private managed care enrollees (Fama, et. al, 1995; HCFA,1997b;
Holahan, et. al, 1995; Hurley, 1993;Rowland & Hanson, 1996). Low-income
families account for 73 percent of Medicaid beneficiaries; however, they represent
less than 30 percent of program expenditures. On the other hand, Medicaid
beneficiaries with disabilities constitute only I 5 percent of program participants, yet
they account for over 39 percent of all Medicaid spending. This disparity has been
largely attributed to beneficiaries with disabilities reliance on specialized, recurrent
medical needs (GAO, 1996).
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Of the current 33 million Medicaid beneficiaries, approximately 6 million are
considered eligible for Medicaid due to disabilify. Of this number, slightly more than
half are eligible on the basis of a mental disability, primarily mental retardation and
mental illnesses. The remaining roughly one-half disabled beneficiaries are eligible
due to blindness or a physical or developmental disability. Children constitute 22
percent of Medicaid recipients with a disability (HCFA, 1997a). According to the
Health Care Financing Administration (1997b) most Medicaid beneficiaries with a
disability require specialized medical care and services which are "atypical" of the
general Medicaid population.
Currently, 16 states and the District of Columbia have begun implementing
prepaid managed care programs for Medicaid beneficiaries with serious disabilities.
Of these 17 programs, 6 mandate enrollment of those with disabilities into managed
care plans: Arizona, Delaware, Oregofl, Tennessee, Utah, and Virginia. An additional
7 states, California, Colorado, Florida, Maryland, Michigan, New Jersey, and
Pennsylvania offer enrollment of beneficiaries with disabilities into general Medicaid
managed care programs. Two states, Ohio and Wisconsin, along with the District of
Columbia, have established small-scale targeted programs specifically for
beneflciaries with disabilities with voluntary enrollment. While Massachusetts, has
for the past six years operated both a small-scale disability specific Medicaid
managed care program, while allowing beneficiaries with disabilities to enroll in the
state's general Medicaid managed care program if they so chose to do so (GAO,
1996; HCFA, 1997a).
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For the six states with mandatory program participation, the overall rates of
enrollment vary greatly, from a low of 15 percent of all Medicaid beneficiaries with
disabilities in Virginia, to Tennessee's mandate of 100 percent participation. The
enrollment rates of Delaware's (mandatory) and Florida's (voluntary) general
Medicaid managed care programs are unable to be determined as neither both state
separates information in regard to enrollees with disabilities from the general non-
disabled beneficiaries. Participation rates for beneficiaries with disabilities into
voluntary general Medicaid managed care programs is markedly lower, ranging from
New Jersey, with 3 percent, to Colorado, with slightly under 20 percent. Participation
by eligible beneficiaries into voluntary programs was even lower yet with Wisconsin
having I I percent and Ohio less than I percent. Massachusetts administers a prepaid
program to serve beneficiaries with disabilities while allows beneficiaries the freedom
to enroll in the general managed care plan, and has a five percent participation rate in
the disabled health plan. In 1996, the last year for which information is available for
the District of Columbia's program, only 8 beneficiaries chose to enroll in their
program targeting children with disabilities, resulting in a participation rate of .25
percent of the 3,200 eligible beneficiaries (HCFA, 1997b).
Four states with voluntary prepaid managed care programs specifically
designed for Medicaid beneficiaries with disabilities vary greatly in terms of
arrangement and disabled sub-population targeted. As stated above, the District of
Columbia's program, The Managed Care System for Disabled Special Needs
Children, is aimed at children with disabilities. Ohio's program, Accessing Better
Care, is designed for physically disabled and chronically ill non-elderly adults, yet
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Wisconsin's, I-Care is open to all disabled beneficiaries over the age of 15.
Massachusetts' program, Community Medical Assistance, is focused on those with
severe physical disabilities, and those with disorders related to end-stage AIDS, while
allowing these beneficiaries with disabilities to enroll in the state's general prepaid
Medicaid program (GAO,1996; HCFA, 1997b).
Of the six states which require Medicaid benefisiaries with disabilities to
enroll in prepaid Medicaid managed care plans, four (Arizona, Delaware, Oregon, and
Tennessee) mandate such enrollment for all Medicaid beneficiaries (GAO, 1996).
However, only Tennessee has attained a 100 percent participation rate. The others
grant exceptions to mandated enrollment under certain circumstances. Oregon allows
beneficiaries to select traditional fee-for-service providers when Medicaid managed
care plans are found to be unable to meet the beneficiaries health care needs. In
Arizona, I.{ative Americans living on reservations may select Indian Health Services
providers instead of prepaid Medicaid managed care plans. Delaware has not
achieved 100 percent participation, however data analysis specifically for
beneficiaries with disabilities is impossible because this state does not separate
enrollment data between disable and non-disabled enrollees. The other two states,
Utah and Virginia, mandate enrollment only in small-scale demonstration sites for
beneficiaries with disabilities in urban areas (GAO, 1996; HCFA, 1997b).
Medicaid traditionally pays for two broad Upes of health care for beneficiaries
with the most severe disabilities: institutional care, and home and community-based
long-term care. Institutional care, for those with the most severe disabilities, is
generally provided in skilled nursing facilities, intermediate care facilities for the
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mentally retarded (ICF's/IvIR), and institutes for mental diseases (IMD's). Eligibility
for home and communify-based long-terrn care services require that beneficiaries
have with severe disabilities and that they would be at risk for institutionalization they
were not provided with significant resources and community supports. These services
are often referred to as diversion programs, as the goal of such services is to divert
people from nursing home or IFC/MR placements. Diversion programs often involve
adaptive rather than restorative services, i.e. those services that are done for an
individual with little expectation of acquiring new skills. Examples of such services
are: such as personal care attendant, adult day care, and homemaker services focusing
on activities of daily living (dressing, cooking, toileting, etc.).
Of the 16 states and the District of Columbia that have begun implementing
prepaid managed care programs that serve Medicaid beneficiaries with disabilities, 13
programs exclude one or both institutional and community-based long-terrn care from
their Medicaid managed care plan, and provide these services under the traditional
fee-for-service program. Twelve deny beneficiaries requiring institutional placement
prepaid managed care enrollment. And ten excluded those needing diversion services
(HCFA, 1997b). Only Arizona and Tennessee provide all services under a prepaid
managed care system, although primary and acute health care is provided under a
different arrangement than long-term care services (HCFA, 1997b). Several problems
have been cited with attempting to integrate acute and long-term care services (GAO,
1996; HCFA, 1996b; HCFA, 1997a;Ltetz, 1994). Few primary care plans have
significant experience providing long-tenn care services. The lack of generally
accepted care standards was also noted, as was the potential "demise" of existing
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community-based care providers (GAO, 1996). Rate setting for a combined set of
diverse health care services poses additional problems. Concerns of state officials
were noted that had arisen from fears that integrating these two systems may have the
result of prepaid medical plans emphasizing medical technologies over supportive
social services that most beneficiaries prefer (GAO, 1996;Luetz, 1994).
Additionally, most health care practitioners operate from an acute care "curative"
model and people with serious and persistent disabilities do not fit well into this
paradigm, as a restoration of functioning is not always a possibility. Integration also
raises concerns over a single entity (i.e. provider) assuming exceedingly more
responsibility and control over a vulnerable person with severe disabilities life (GAO,
l ee6).
Issues of Oualitv and Access
When enrolling Medicaid beneficiaries with severe disabilities into managed
care plans, particularly mandatory plans, states' efforts to ensure access to high
quality care become more important. Essock and Goldman (1995) expressed the view
that those with serious disabilities are often far too vulnerable to be expected to self-
advocate, and that many traditional managed care quality assurance measures (e.g.
satisfaction surveys, and rates of grievances, complaints and disenrollment) are
greatly inadequate in measuring levels of quality services for this population. In
studying quality measurements of states' Medicaid managed care programs for those
with serious disabilities, the author found that quality assurance mechanisms fell into
two broad categories: 1.) creating safeguards into the Medicaid managed care
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programs' structure to ensure access to services; and 2.) adapting existing aspects of
their programs to directly address the unique needs of those with disabilities (Epstein,
1997; GAO, 1996; Gold & Felt, 1995; Landon, Tobias, & Epstein, 1998; Lurie,
Moscovice, Finch, Christianson, & Popkin, 1992; Sisk, Gorman, Reisinger, Glied,
DuMoucel & Hynes, 1996).
Landon and his colleagues (1998) note that with regard to Medicaid managed
c,are, states have shifted from health claims payer to purchaser and determiner of
health care services. With this philosophical conversion, most states have established
precautions so that beneficiaries are assured access to quality care. Additionally,
quality monitoring has become even more critical for elderly or those beneficiaries
with disabilities, as private managed care plans, which have recently begun
contracting with states for these services, have virfually no experience with this
population of vulnerable enrollees (Landon et al., 1998).
Chang and his colleagues (1998) found in their qualitative analysis of
Tennessee's TennCare managed care program for its Medicaid beneficiaries, several
causes for concern in regard to the distribution of risk with regard to those with
mental health and chemical health disabilities. This non-risk-adjusted carve-out
program for beneficiaries with disabilities, called TennCare Partners was created by
"a flawed design" (p. 864) that allows funds which had previously been available only
to beneficiaries with serious and persistent mental illnesses to be open to the entire
Medicaid managed care program. Also, TennCare Partners uses one capitated rate for
all enrollees regardless of diagnosis or previous level of service use, thus potentially
creating an incentive to health care providers to underserve those with the highest
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anticipated service needs. In addition to establishing a system of risk-adjusted
capitation rates, this sfudy called for "an effective quality-assurance program", stating
curtly that "the seriously and persistently mentally ill cannot effectively advocate for
themselves" (p. 868). In their analysis, states were also cautioned to start enrolling
Medicaid beneficiaries with disabilities into managed care plans on an experimental
basis, as opposed to the "wholesale" carve-out initiated by Tennessee in 1996 (Chang,
Kiser, Bailey, Martins, Gibson, Schaberg, Mirvis, & Applegate, 1998).
Lurie et al. (1992) studied a HCFA demonstration project in the late 1980's in
Hennepin County, Minnesota which enrolled "the chronically mentally ill" into
prepaid Medicaid managed care plans. This research determined that with proper
safeguards in place, no conclusive evidence arose that persons with serious mental
illnesses encountered any negative effects when enrolled into Medicaid managed
care, as compared to the traditional fee-for-service system (Lurie, et al., 1992).
However, Landon et al. (1998) asserted that quality assurance measures are difficult
to determine within Medicaid managed care, as enrollees move in and out of the
Medicaid program rapidly, stating that overall, 45 percent of Medicaid beneficiaries
leave within one year. Although Landon's point may have little consequence for this
discussion, as those Medicaid beneficiaries with serious disabilities are less likely to
move in and out of the Medicaid program as other groups, such as TANF recipients
whose Medicai$ eligibility status may change due to employment.
A GAO report (1996) declared that states' efforts to address issues of quality
assurance for prepaid Medicaid managed care beneficiaries with disabilities have
come exclusively from either those states with mandatory enrollment or those with
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programs targeted specifically for enrollees with disabilities. Of these states with
significant track records addressing issues of quality assurance, establishing
safeguards to ensure access to quality services center around both a sufficient amount
of preplanning and active consensus building (GAO, 1996; Gold, Sparer, & Chu,
l ee6).
According to state Medicaid officials, most critical to the development of
Medicaid managed care for this population was involving beneficiaries with
disabilities and their advocates into the planning and program design development
from the onset (cited in GAO, 1996). Both disability advocates and state Medicaid
officials cited consensus-huilding through community meetings as the key to
transitioning programs from a fee-for-service to a managed care model
(Bodenheimer, 1997; GAO, lgg6; Gold, 1991). Bodenheimer (1997) specifically
noted that consensus meetings to develop universally understood definitions of terms
had been crucial. Continued "maintenance" stakeholder meetings were also viewed
as important even after states had begun implementation of these programs (GAO,
1996). The GAO report (1996) also noted that these states with significant experience
addressing quality assurance issues had considerably innovative ways of adjusting
Medicaid managed care programs for beneficiaries with disabilities. Such plans
included: allowing beneficiaries to continue seeing their existing network of
providers, not requiring primary physician approval to see a specialist, establishing
the largest possible "pool" of providers and services available to choose from, and
providing paid consumer advocates to assist beneficiaries (GAO, 1996).
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Assessment of access to quality health care services for people with
disabilities revolves principally around the health care plans' definition of "medical
necessify". Managed health plans have traditionally reimbursed for services that
restore health, cure disease, or by other means, return the individual to a previous
level of functioning. However, many persons with severe, long-term disabilities have
conditions in which the resumption of independent functioning is a remote possibility.
Strict interpretation of "medical necessity", focused on improvements in functioning
may exclude those services which would aim at prevention of future regression in
ability. Also, non-medical maintenance services, such as personal care services,
supported employment, and other social services, ffioy offer little hope of forestalling
the advancement of an illness, yet promote an individual's existing quality of life.
A recent study at the Center for Health Policy Research found that in 96Yo of
health plans reviewed, the determination of medical necessity was at the health plans'
discretion (Gabriele, 1997). While most states' Medicaid programs address concerns
over "medical necessity" through some form of an appeals process, Landon et al.
(1998) noted that two states, Arizona and Oregotr, directly address the definition of
"medically necessary" services for Medicaid beneficiaries with disabilities. Arizona
inserted the concept of "habilitation" (i.e. those services which focus on maintaining a
beneficiary's current level of independence) within the language of their Medicaid
managed care contracts when their plans began to serve enrollees with disabilities
which had the result of both greatly expanding those health care services which are
covered and the ability of disabled beneficiaries to remain in their own homes
(Bodenheimer, 1997; Gold, 1997). Similarly, Oregon developed specific guidelines
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for the inclusion of "non-medical outcomes", e.B. those which enhance a beneficiary's
independence, into their managed care plans (Balaban, McCall, & Bauer, 1994;
McCall, Wrightson, Paringer, & Trapnell, 1994).
Additionally, Oregon, along with Wisconsin, have established requirements
for "designated advocates" to help ensure access and quality of health care services.
Both states require contracted plans to have designated staff to assist enrollees. These
staff are called "exceptional needs care coordinators" in Oregon, while in Wisconsin
they are known as "Medicaid advocates" (GAO, 1996). Oregon has also established
an ombudsman's office to advocate for beneficiaries with disabilities enrolled in
contracted health plans (Bodenheimer, 1997).
Another area of review is quality assurance mechanisms used in monitoring
the compliance of managed care plans' contractual agreements with Medicaid.
Federal HCFA regulations largely dictate states' efforts to monitor plan compliance.
Although several initiatives have been targeted to measure quality perfoffnance
indicators, three such indicators have quickly become the most prominent. These
three attempt to develop perforrnance indicators are: HCFA's Quality Assurance
Reform Initiative (QARI); the Consumer Assessment of Health Plans (CAHPS); and
a version of the private managed care industry quality assurance standard, the Health
Plan Employer Data Information Set (HEDIS) which has been adapted specifically
for the Medicaid managed care population, termed Medicaid HEDIS (Epstein , 1997;
Kolb, 1997).
QARI guidelines, which were implemented in 1995, include the primary
program components of internal quality assurance indicators for health plans to self
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regulate, performance indicators for continuous monitoring of quality, and state
oversight to provide extemal supervision of managed care plans (Epstein,1997).
Epstein (1997) and Gold and Felt (1995) both reviewed a three state (including
Minnesota) QARI demonstration project in 1993. Both studies concurred that while
QARI does appear to hold promise for the future of quality assurance monitoring, its
implementation should be a long-term rather than a short-terrn goal, as current
Medisaid data collection methods are inconsistent with QARI's data requirements
(Epstein,1997; Gold & Felt, 1995). CAHPS, introduced in January of 1997, has
explicit goals to provide a comprehensive standardtzed consumer satisfaction survey
in regard to quality and access to care. Epstein (1997) found that initial
standardization had been difficult in as a result of the diversity of state programs and
due to the fact that at this point, it remains untested.
Within the last several years, HEDIS has become the most commonly used
quality assurance tool in the private managed care industry. This set of performance
measures is designed to standardized across states and health plans the way health
plans report data. In 1995, a group of private managed care industry leaders and
Medicaid officials led by the National Association for Quality Assurance developed a
version of HEDIS specifically for Medicaid populations. Although only released in
I99l , Epstein (1997) noted that already the majority of Medicaid managed care
programs plan on mandating that participating health plans use Medicaid HEDIS
(Epstein, 1997). HEDIS currently measures five health plan performance areas:
quality, access and patient satisfaction, membership and utilization, finance, and
descriptions of health plan management (Kolb, 1991)
Medicaid Managed Care 28
While all three of these quality assurance initiatives have been widely
accepted by state programs and show great promise, none have demonstrated any
significant experience. Additionally, HCFA has not yet developed any standardized
quality assurance measures for Medicaid managed care programs specifically
targeting the needs of beneficiaries with disabilities and their vulnerabilities. Landon,
et al. ( 1998) noted that states have the ability to regulate or legislate change, in
addition to health plan compliance. States also have "strong levers to promote
cooperative efforts in qualify improvement" (Landon, et al., 1998, p. 215).
HCFA guidelines also require that managed cate health plans must allow
beneficiaries to, whenever possible, be able to choose their health care providers, as
well as alrange for an appeals procedure to process complaints and denials of services
(GAO, 1996). Additionally, a provision in the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 requires
that state Medicaid managed care programs must offer enrollees at least two plans to
choose from in urban metropolitan areas, and at least two providers within a plan to
choose from in rural areas (cited in Richardson, 1998). Anotherprovision of this act
mandates that states develop safeguards to prevent conflict of interest issues related to
county or local government entities becoming providers of health care services. It
requires that any organization that makes eligibilify determinations, have
guardianship over, or administer enrollment on behalf of the state, cannot be the same
organization that contracts with the state to provide services (Richardson, 1998).
Under Medicaid's traditional fee-for-service system, states have had a ready
access to data in regard to all services provided to all Medicaid beneficiaries, as they
reimbursed providers on a per service basis. This data, called claims data in a fee-for-
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service system, is not necessarily compiled in a prepaid managed care system because
a flat rate is paid to the provider instead on a per service basis. This potentially useful
information, termed encounter data by managed care plans, consists of enrollee
information such as type of service provided, enrollee diagnosis, frequency of contact,
and identity of health care providers (GAO, 1996). Gabriele (1997) noted that states
generally demand little data from their managed care contracts, "contracts require
plans to establish quality assurance systems, but few contracts contain precise
specifications regarding data to be reported" (p. 14). Richardson (1998) has
suggested that encounter data could provide key information and serve the function of
monitoring quality assurance and health plan contract compliance, as well as aid in
program planning by predicting future service utilization trends. As shall be
discussed later, encounter data may also be helpful in determining appropriate health
plan reimbursement rates.
Individual enrollee encounter data could be especially beneficial to those
enrollees with disabilities. This type of person level encounter data could identify
providers that serve special needs populations, what services are provided to high-cost
beneficiaries, and patterns of service underutilization (GAO, 1996). In fact, the state
of Oregon has used their system for services provided to beneficiaries with
disabilities, albeit with varied results, to compare practice guidelines with utilization
rates, identifu high-cost enrollees, and analyze occurrences of adverse selection by
participating health plans on the basis of specific diagnoses (Landon et al., 1998;
McCall, et al., 1994).
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While encounter data appears promising, the experiences of states thus far
have proven insufficient at this time. Only three states with experience serving
Medicaid beneficiaries with disabilities, Arizona, Oregon, and Tennessee, have
attempted to address challenges in collecting reliable encounter data (GAO, 1996).
Arizona has the only sufficiently developed encounter data collection system
(Bodenheimer, 1997; Gold, l99l), however, a 1996 GAO report noted that the state
has spent over $30 million over the past decade to arrive at the point that information
in their encounter database could be used to determine quality assurance. Oregon has
experienced problems related to the amount of resources and staff time required to
develop such a system (Balaban, 1994; Landon, 1998). Meanwhile, Tennessee saw
serious problems with the lack of universal definitions among participating health
plans to develop accurate encounter data, and as a result, a complete data collection
system has not as yet been implemented (Chang et a1., 1998; Landon, 1998). In
addition to the implications of the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 for Medicaid
managed care programs as noted earlier, related to states being required to develop
safeguards to prevent conflict of interest issues related to county or local government
entities becoming health care payer, provider, and determiner of service eligibility,
this act also mandates that all state prepaid Medicaid managed care programs begin to
transmit detailed enrollee encounter data electronically to HCFA as of 1999. The
purpose of this is for rapid quality analysis and oversight, even though most states
appear unprepared (Richardson, 1 998).
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Risk-Adjustments and Risk Sharing
Sufficient quality assurance measures do provide protection for vulnerable
populations of Medicaid beneficiaries against potential abuses within a prepaid
managed care system. Paying participating health plans a capitated flat rate to
provide enrollees with a predetermined set of health care services produces an
incentive for providers to improve efficiencies and eliminate unneeded services.
Nonetheless, this arrangement simultaneously creates additional risks to enrollees.
Plans may choose to increase their profit margin by intentionally not providing
needed services or providing diminished quality of services, termed intentional
underutilization. Also, when plans are paid the same rate for a diverse group of
beneficiaries with differing levels of service needs, the risk exists for plans to attempt
to enroll only the healthiest, least costly beneficiaries, a practice known as creaming.
These risks can be greater when enrolling beneficiaries with special needs, as it
provides for the assumption of health plans of added financial risk.
Conventional managed care rate setting approaches do not currently address
the disincentives that do exist when attempting to serve those with disabilities. When
establishing prepaid capitated rates, states have traditionally separated beneficiaries
into the broadest of sub-populations; i.e., the elderly, children, those with disabilities,
and non-elderly, non-disabled adults. This practice has assumed that those within
each broad category with less than anticipated health care costs would offset those
with higher than anticipated costs. In most states, rate-setting methods have not
addressed the differing health care costs associated with different disability groups.
(Richardson, 1998).
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With such wide ranging costs associated with serving a broad range of
disabilities, the 1996 GAO report noted that participating health plans' margin of
profits or losses may not be directly related to the efficiency of the health care
delivery system. "Instead, these profits or losses may be a function of how many
high-cost cases it does or does not enroll." (GAO, 1996, p. 50). Health plans which
experience financial losses as a result of disproportionally serving high-cost enrollees
is said to experience "adverse selection", while those with more low-cost enrollees
are said to have "favorable selections" (GAO, 1996).
The General Accounting Office (1996) also noted several methods by which
health plans may seek to avoid experiencing adverse selection. Health plans may
avoid high-cost enrollees by dropping providers that serve costly specialty patients.
Or they may use direct marketing techniques to solicit the enrollment of healthier
beneficiaries, while discouraging or failing to market to those with disabilities or
other groups associated with increased health care costs. This process of direct
consumer marketing has been largely prohibited by states, yet still occurs (GAO,
1ee6).
HCFA ( 1997b) has stated that most health care plans that participate in
Medicaid managed care programs describe their plans as experiencing adverse
selection. However, Medicaid officials have been unable to determine the validity of
such claims through analysis of standardized encounter data. And without such
encounter data, this lack of accountability has prevented HCFA from refuting these
claims that nearly all plans experience adverse selection.
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States have begun to approach concerns of participating health plans by
addressing issues of potential financial risks. Thus far, states have focused their
efforts by one of three broad fypes of initiatives to reduce the perceived additional
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risks of enrolling beneficiaries with disabilities. First, most states have sought a risk-
sharing arrangement, known as "reinsurance", which reimburses health plans for
financial losses incurred by providing services to beneficiaries with higher anticipated
costs. Secondly, two states have adopted risk-adjusted capitation rates apart from
their non-disabled enrollees for those with disabilities that more closely match the
anticipated costs of services to beneficiaries with disabilities known as a 'ocarve-out".
Five states have provided a reinsurance program to guard against losses incurred,
while at the same time, requiring plans to reimburse the states for profits realized
beyond a certain agreed upon level, this concept is known as a "risk corridor" (GAO,
1996; HCFA, 1997b, Richardson, 1998).
States rely on reinsurance to decrease concerns related to financial risks of
health plans attempting to serve enrollees with disabilities. States offer reinsurance to
protect participating plans against instances of adverse selection, for which health
plans pay states reinsurance premiums. While reinsurance addresses concerns of
adverse selection, it does not challenge the financial incentives of health plans to
intentionally underserve or to seek to enroll only healthier beneficiaries. (HCFA,
teeTb).
Risk adjusted carve-outs are seen as holding promise for public managed care
programs for enrollees with disabilities. Research has not been centered on Medicaid
beneficiaries, but rather on Medicaid managed care programs (HCFA, 1997b).
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Carve-out prepayment rates are adjusted based upon either beneficiaries' previous use
of services or on their disability diagnosis. Research has noted that prior utilization
rates are a better predictor of future care costs for populations with disabilities as
compared to non-disabled Medicaid managed care beneficiaries, as these groups have
a greater portion of their health care costs incurred from long-standing, and persistent
disorders, as opposed to acute incidents (GAO, 1996).
In Ohio's Medicaid managed care carve-out for enrollees with disabilities,
called Accessing Better Care, capitated rates are based upon beneficiaries' prior
utilization of services in the previous fee-for-service system. Seven different "rate
cells" (i.e. reimbursement rates) have been established with the differing progression
of prepaid rates colresponding to previous costs to provide services. Of all enrollees
with disabilities, over 55 percent have been classified into the lowest cell (Grundy &
Eliopoulos, 1997). Massachusetts' carve-out rates are based upon beneficiary primary
diagnosis with special consideration given for secondary diagnoses. Grundy and
Eliopoulos ( 1991) have detected more severe diagnoses being registered by
participating plans than were medically indicated, a process noted as "upcoding". To
address difficulties in accurate rate setting, some states have begun to use individual-
level encounter data to arrive at their capitated rates (GAO, 1996). Carve-outs are a
relatively recent addition to capitated rate setting and are viewed by many states as
potentially worthwhile, yet difficult to administer and maintain (GAO, 1996; HCFA,
1997b; Richardson, 1 998).
Risk corridors are the only mechanism that limits health plans' potential
profits, and thus incentives to use intentional underutilization and creaming
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techniques. The point at which sharing of health care profits and losses, known as the
risk corridor's width, varies amongst state programs. Also varied is the degree to
which risks and benefits are distributed between participating health plans and states.
Risk corridors appear to hold the greatest potential for rate setting for programs
specifically targeting Medicaid beneficiaries with disabilities (GAO, 1996; HCFA,
1991b; Richardson, 1998). However, a GAO (1996) report cautioned states that
because health plans know risk corridors proposed function prior to negotiation of
capitated rates, risk corridors have the result of being a "retrospective adjustment with
a prospective impact" (p. 59). This occurs as a result of the future payment of
potential losses influencing the current negotiation of the rate at which the reinsurance
will begin. Health plans negotiate from a position of presenting themselves to
contractors as incurring losses when they may not actually he.
The Minnesota Demonstration Proiect for People with Disabilities
The state of Minnesota's Department of Human Services (DHS) is currently in
the process of considering a system-wide paradigm conversion in its administration of
the state's publicly financed health care program, Medicaid. DHS's intention for this
program conversion is to greatly alter the state's Medicaid program, Medical
Assistance, financing and reimbursement mechanisms. DHS has expressed a desire
to move the program away from the traditional fee-for-service (FFS) arrangement
towards a capitated managed care model (Mhl DHS, 1998a).
Under the oversight of the Minnesota Legislature the Department of Human
Services has been developing, through various demonstration projects over the past
Medicaid Managed Care 36
decade, the means to pennanently move the state's health care policy toward a
managed care model of financing and service delivery for its enrollees of Medical
Assistance. A statewide Medicaid managed care system was explored through
demonstration projects throughout the state for its non-disabled, non-elderly Medicaid
populations. One of those demonstration models, the Prepaid Medical Assistance
Program (PMAP) has been adopted and has begun to be implemented statewide. The
majority of Minnesota's Medicaid recipients are currently covered through PMAP;
however, both elderly enrollees who are concurrently eligible for both Medicaid and
Medicare benefits, and those non-elderly enrollees who have serious disabilities, have
been excluded from enrollment into Medicaid managed care plans. A demonstration
project is also seeking to address the needs of "dually eligible" Medicaid/Medicare
beneficiaries, serving 4,000 enrollees in a program called the Minnesota Long-Term
Care Options Program (HCFA, 1997b).
In 1997, approximately 68,000 persons across Minnesota were determined
eligible for its state Medicaid program, Medical Assistance, as the result of a
disability, such as mental illnesses, developmental disabilities, and physical
disabilities. Many of these Medicaid beneficiaries with disabilities have multiple
qualifying disabilities. This population of beneficiaries with disabilities is expected to
increase at least five percent per year in the near future. Medical Assistance financial
outlays exceeded the $1 billion mark in1997 (MN DHS, 1998b). While those with
disabilities within the state of Minnesota compromise only 16 percent of Medical
Assistance beneficiaries, this group represents over 40 percent of all Medicaid
expenditures (MI.{ DHS, 1998a; MI{ DHS, 1998b).
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The Demonstration Project for People with Disabilities (DPPD) has been
developed by DHS to coordinate and evaluate a capitated managed health care
delivery system for people serious disabilities (MN DHS, 1998a). The intent of this
project is to allow flexibility in discretionary spending, service delivery, and
individualized health care services (Mhf DHS, 1998b, p. 3).
This demonstration project is the outgrowth of an initiative originating
separately, yet at the same time, in both Olmsted and Blue Earth counties. Each of
these counties sought to implement local integrated funding options for their residents
with developmental disabilities. As a result, the 1995 Legislature authorized DHS to
create two demonstration projects within the state of Minnesota to serve the social
service and health care needs of persons with developmental disabilities who are
eligible for Medical Assistance through a Medicaid managed care system (Minnesota
Laws 1995, Chapter 20J, Article 8, section42). These two demonstration sites are
Olmsted County, and the Southern Minnesota Health Care Initiative of Blue Earth,
Freeborn, LeSueur, and Sibley counties. Olmsted County's project originally went by
the name of Project Foresight and was targeted exclusively towards those with
developmental disabilities, however, expanded to include physical and mental
disabilities in early 1997 .
In 1,997, the state Legislature expanded this program to include an additional
three sites for planning purposes only from across the state. Additionally, the scope
of all five projects was expanded to include all individuals within the demonstration
projects who are eligible for Medicaid due to any long-term serious disability
(Minnesota Laws 1997, Chapter 203, Article 8, section l). The three sites which were
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added are Itasca County; Hennepin Counfy; and The Northern Minnesota Managed
Care Joint Powers Board of Carlton, Cook, Koochiching, Lake, and St. Louis
Counties. Currently, Legislative action has only authorized planning and preparation
in these three planning sites. There are no plans to begin implementation in these
planning sites, and such action would require added legislative authorization and
additional funding.
Both of the two original demonstration sites are to begin implementation by
mid-1999, and anticipate serving 4,700 people with disabilities by July, 2000.
Approximately one-half of these 4,700 enrollees will be from Olmsted County, while
the other half from the four counties comprising the SMHI. Enrollment of
beneficiaries with developmental disabilities and mental illnesses will commence in
1999, while those with physical disabilities will begin enrollment by early 2000.
(Kolb, 1997; MN DHS, 1998a; MN DHS, 1998b).
The Legislature along with DHS has established broad structures for a publicly
financed managed health care system to be administered under federal HCFA
guidelines, as well as parameters for "pursuing locally based service delivery models
to provide acute and continuing care services and supports for people with
disabilities" (Kolb, 1997, p.1). However, within this broad context, the specific form
of each model has been left flexible, so that individual county governments or multi-
county collaborative entities have been allowed to determine the specific structures of
each individual managed care plan. It has been left open whether each demonstration
project chooses to administer a public plan where the county's medical center serves
as provider (i.e. the county as payer and provider); or whether the
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county/collaborative entity contracts with a private health provider to vendor out
health care service; or whether the government entify provides services itself, and
contracts with other health care providers (MI.{ DHS, 1998a).
There are, however, several programmatic commonalties and project-wide
design parameters. First, participation in all five projects site will be mandatory upon
implementation and enrollment of beneficiaries. Independent designated consumer
advocates will be available to beneficiaries for assistance through the state's
Ombudsman's Office of Mental Health and Mental Retardation. All acute, long-terln,
and community continuing care services will be integrated into a "continuum of care"
system where enrolled beneficiaries will remain in the same health plan as their health
care needs change, hopefully resulting in a seamless system of services. And, quality
oversight and evaluation systems will be designed into one local, counfy, and state
integrated system. (MN DHS, 1998b).
Additionally, rate setting structures will most likely consist of a risk adjusted
carve-out, and will have time-limited, risk sharing (Hennepin County Health policy
Center, 1997a). Currently, the state of Minnesota is pursuing the creation of a care-
out for Medicaid beneficiaries with disabilities that would attempt to match future
reimbursement rates with pervious costs of services, as opposed to some form of
reinsurance or a risk corridor (MI-{ DHS, 1998b). It was noted by DHS that all health
plans participating in prepaid Medicaid managed care programs within the state of
Minnesota are designated as 501(c)(3) not-for-profit corporations, and one rationale
for a carve-out was that these plans have a self imposed, existing cap on profits.
This alrangement would result in a risk adjustment arrangement similar to a risk
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corridor within a reinsurance program. While revenue suqpluses must be deposited
back within the organization in a 501(c)(3) not-for-profit managed care corporation,
and can not be given directly to individuals within the health plan. However, it
should be noted that 501(c)(3) entities are not prevented from turning a profit, only
from distributing profits directly to members of the organization, and are allowed as
part of the reinvestment process to pay senior executives salaries without limits.
(Hennepin County Health Policy Center, 1997 a; Hennepin County Health Policy
Center, 1997b; Kolb, 1997).
DHS, along with the Minnesota Department of Health, has contracted with
the Park h{icollet Foundation and the University of Minnesota to develop a risk
adjustment methodology that would protect both health care plans and health care
recipients. This would also provide incentives for participating health plans to serve
high-cost, high service need beneflciaries with disabilities by reducing the perceived
potential financial risk of enrolling this population of beneficiaries (MN DHS,
1998b). Another notion similar to this carve-out concept which has been discussed
has been the creation of a "shared pool" amongst all participating health plans where
all plans sign on to one contract for services and, in essence, share all enrollees and all
potential profits and financial risks. This arrangement by placing all parties self
interest into a commonly shared trust would create incentives for providers, health
plans, and government managing entities to cooperate in providing services for
enrollees with disabilities, rather than compete for the healthiest beneficiaries
(Hennepin County, 1997; Hennepin Counfy Health Policy Center, 1997b).
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A quality management system will be designed through DPPD to provide for
consumer safeguards, and health plan contract compliance. Within this proposed
quality management system, there would exist three primary program components.
First, a "quality assurance system" which will focus on setting minimal criteria of
care for consumer protection and access to services are retained. Secondly, a "quality
improvement system" to monitor and analyze quality assurance data, and to provide
for an "ongoing feedback loop of information from consumers of services so that
adaptations and adjustments can be made" (Mlf DHS, 1998b, p. 8). And lastly, this
quality management system is comprised of an "evaluation system" to assess the
demonstration projects' effectiveness and allow for eventual statewide program
replication. In addition to this internal evaluative system, an external independent
evaluation will be included, however, the type and scope of such an evaluation system
has yet to be determined. (MN DHS, 1998b).
In addition to the broad contextual parameters of the development of cost-
containment strategies, quality assurance, outcome measurement and evaluation, and
the integration and coordination of public and private funding sources; oach DPPD
site must include, "involvement of stakeholders in planning, development,
implementation, and evaluation"(Kolb, 1991 , p.1). It is both in DHS's stated public
policy (as well as explicit in legislative law) that service recipients and community
members be involved in the shaping of the public planning process, and the formation
of public policy pursuant to the Community Social Service Act of 1990 (cited in
Hennepin County Health Policy Center, 1996; MN DHS, 1996b; DHS, 1998a).
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The Department of Human Services have convened a work group of DHS
officials, local advisory boards, and demonstration site county administrative staff to
study more closely issues of care coordination. This group has been asked to develop
a specific service coordination model that would sufficiently address several areas.
First, to create a service delivery system with separate, distinct gatekeeping and
service provision functions. Also, this group is to develop performance standards that
are standardized, and commonly recognized across disability groups. Additionally,
the work group is to define minimum acceptable provider qualifications. (MN DHS,
l eesb).
Another task of this work group is to examine provision of the Balanced
Budget Act of 1997 that mandate that states develop safeguards to prevent conflict of
interest issues related to county or local government entities becoming providers of
health care services (MN DHS, 1998b, Richardson, 1998). Within the state of
Minnesota, county Social Service Departments are the primary determiners of
program eligibility, which conflict with the possible role of health plan gatekeeper.
Unintended consequences of seemingly unrelated legislation have a potential
to have a vast impact on the implementation of providing specialized health care
services to Medicaid enrollees with disabilities. The Americans with Disabilities Act
of 1990 (cited in Karger and Stoesz, 1998) has provisions which mandate that those
with disabilities have the same opportunities and choices as the non-disabled. These
provisions may require Minnesota's Demonstration Project for People with
Disabilities to limit its choice of health plans to only those offered to enrollees of the
non-disabled prepaid Medicaid managed care program PMAP. This may greatly
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impact the degree to which this demonstration project can be innovative and tailor its
services to the unique service needs of this population. (Karger &, Stoesz, 1998; Kolb,
r9e7).
One of the greatest potential benefits of Medicaid managed care is that states
can hold health plans accountable for outcomes and perfonnance. Whereas, the
traditional fee-for-service system where state pays claims to hundreds or even
thousands of providers, with Medicaid managed care programs, the contracted
providers are generally small in number, and are required to achieve outcome
measures. The Kaiser Commission on the Future of Medicaid ( 1995) found that
research on general non-disabled Medicaid managed care programs has demonstrated:
1.) there is a decline in the inappropriate use of emergency services,2.) the overall
quality of care is comparable, and 3.) that most plans save a minimum of 5 to 15
percent from the costs associated with the traditional fee-for-service system. Sisk et
al. ( 1 996) in their study of non-disable Medicaid managed care enrollees in New York
City found that this small population enjoyed both, better access to health care, and
increased consumer satisfaction over traditional Medicaid enrollees. However,
significant concerns need to be addressed. Tobler & Gordon (1996) in a survey of
Florida's Medicaid managed care system found: 1.) over one-third of the healthplans
failed to provide documentation medical screening for children;2.) 40 percent of the
health care medical records departments failed to document whether the patient had
received acceptable levels of care; 3.) 28 percent of the medical records departments
failed to document a hospital discharge plan, and 4.) half of all plans failed to
evaluate new members within 90 days of enrollment as required by the state.
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Those Medicaid managed care beneficiaries with disabilities, however appear
to be rather dissimilar to non-disabled enrollees and have differing health care needs.
Those states with signiflcant experience enrolling Medicaid recipients with
disabilities into publicly financed managed care plans have reported results that
appear quite tentative and varied both in terms of quality and access to care for the
enrollee, and cost savings to the payer (Gold, Sparer, & Chu, 1996, HCFA, 1997b1'
Kaiser Commission on the Future of Medicaid, 1995; McCall, Wrightson, Paringer,
and Trapnell, 1994; Mollica, Riely, & Rydell, 1994). The GAO report (1996)
seriously questioned the use of servise and payment capitation, in addition to other
traditional managed care mechanisms for this group of vulnerable Medicaid
beneficiaries.
Tobler & Gordon ( 1996) cited a state Health Care Financing Director who said
that although "there is no evidence to suggest that these individuals will get quality
care" that his state would nonetheless "adopt a learn by doing approach and [they] are
experimenting with enrolling people with disabilities and the elderly into managed
care" (p. 61). Yet Gabriele (1991) noted with regard to Medicaid managed care
programs forpeople with psychiatric disabilities that, "1.) Managed care is neither
intrinsically good nor bad. 2.)lt is neither the engine of destruction that will bring
down the mental health care system, nor is it the magic bullet that will fix it. 3.)
Designed and implemented well, managed care has the potential to improve an
inadequate and inflexible public mental health system; designed and implemented
poorly, it can further erode access to appropriate services"(p. 4). The same state
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health care financing director quoted above that efficiencies "come from how you
deliver care and not how you pay for it" (Tobler & Gordon, 1996, p. 65).
45
Summarv
-
Review of the research has demonstrated that managed care techniques and
disability needs are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Some managed care methods
have the potential to be effective in terms of both quality and access for those with
disabilities by increasing efficiencies in a best practice model of delivery. Planned
adeptly, managed care has the capacity to improve a bureaucratic public health care
system in a holistic and flexible manner by focusing on outcomes and results, rather
than outputs and efforts. Such a system driven by "what works" for each individual
through targeting to her or his individual needs could replace a system where the
focus at times has been on funding institutions and programs, and requiring service
recipients to conform to existing services. However, to date, public, Medicaid
managed care programs for persons with disabilities has had limited success and its
long-term implications are untested.
With Medicaid managed care systems presented in this context of service
delivery and reimbursement mechanisms; some concerns do arise as many states
move toward a public managed care system for people with serious and persistent
disabilities. Three relevant issues present themselves as most paramount.
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medical, social, and service needs of those with serious disabilities.
historically solely viewed as the public trust.
which is driven by fiscal pressures and containment of costs.
One wonders of the adaptability of the managed care system to adequately
serve the unique service needs of those with disabilities. The primary stated intent of
managed care techniques has been to cut costs in a health care delivery system. How
can a system created upon the principles of severity reduction, health restoration, and
cure accommodate the needs of a population with chronic long-term disabilities that
require many non-medical, yet necessary services needed for maintenance of a certain
level of functioning? Managed care mechanisms have demonstrated an impact upon
healthy groups where disease prevention and consumer education are primary points
of focus; however, with regard individuals with serious and persistent disabilities,
such efforts may be of little utility.
Another concern relates to the turning over the public interests to private
entities. Such outsourcing of the public trust must be viewed as a majorphilosophical
shift within social policy and social justice. The history of the managed care industry
has been essentially a private venture of self-interest, and such an industry was
designed for the purpose of making money for individuals through increased
efficiencies found through cutting costs and limiting access in the delivery of health
care services. Accountability should be clear and, and it should be public to ensure
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that the target population of Medicaid beneficiaries with disabilities remain the
intended beneficiaries of the move toward a managed care health delivery system.
Consumers, family members, and disability advocates must be afforded meaningful
input into planning, design, and implementation as the public health care system
evolves from the public domain to private contracts for services.
Prudent public social planning dictates that public leaders be proactive and
envision a desirable system, and then develop the financing mechanisms to support
such a system. Rather, a reactionary system has been created from discerning which
possible financing mechanisms exist, and then devising a system based upon those
structures. Managed care is a tool, not a panacea. Quality of life and quality services
are not always cost effective. The onus should remain on how and what services are
delivered, and not how are such services paid for.
Social justice demands that everyone; regardless of disability, has the right and
responsibility of full participation in society. Access to quality health care services
under the traditional Medicaid system has been granted as a right of such
participation, and so "regardless of ability to pay" should be added as a right to such
quality health care. In our system of governance, the public trust is the only
institution established to perfonn on behalf of our citizenry. The social contract
between the government and the public must ovemrle any private contract for
services. The needs of the community and its members must supersede those of any
private entity.
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CHAPTER THREE
Discussion
The purpose of this study was to analyze the policies of states'Medicaid
managed care programs with special implications for the state of Minnesota while it
continues to with the planning stages of its managed care program. This policy
analysis focuses on reconciling the benefits of states' Medicaid managed care
initiatives through the balancing of economic feasibility of financial risk-sharing
amongst some stakeholders (the state and private health plans) and access to quality
health care services for others (Medicaid managed care recipients with disabilities).
Karger and Stoesz's (1998) policy analysis framework has been selected to aid
with the interpretation of these states' Medicaid managed care initiatives for people
with disabilities. Karger and Stoesz's framework was selected as its scope of analysis
includes the historical background of the policy, description of the situation that
necessitated the policy, the description of the policy, and the analysis of the policy. In
addition, Karger and Stoesz's ' model goes beyond elementary cost-benefit style
analysis to include considerations of the feasibility of the policy on political,
economic, and administrative means (Karger & Stoesz, 1998).
Overview of Significant Findings
The historical background, precipitating factors, and description of current
Medicaid managed care models has been illustrated in detail in the review of the
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literature above and will not be restated here; however, some summative statements
can be made. While a considerable number of states have recently begun enrolling
persons with disabilities into prepaid Medicaid managed care plans, few have any
significant experience or data supporting a best practice model. Private managed care
plans, with whom states have been contracting with to provide services to those with
disabilities, have had few encounters with this population of Medicaid beneficiaries.
This population group is quite dissimilar to other managed care populations in terms
of service needs. However, this group, those with disabilities, is in itself a rather
diverse heterogeneous group with quite varied health care service needs amongst the
group. States have encountered two primary challenges: appropriate access to health
care services by beneficiaries; and providing adequate services in a fiscally sound
manner. Issues of access have been viewed most often in terms of effective quality
assurance measures. Those measures that involve beneficiaries and their advocates in
all levels of programming appear most effective. Additionally, adequate encounter
data has been found important in monitoring health plan compliance with
beneficiaries' health care service needs. Risk sharing was found to be paramount
when creating a financially sound managed health care system. A pool of both health
plans and state governments sharing both risks and possible benefits appeared most
effective in providing incentives to adequately serve this potential "high-risk"
population. However, these risk corridors are largely untested with regard to long-
term use.
With regard to Karger and Stoesz's (1998) framework for policy analysis,
most states have moved toward Medicaid managed care programs with the primary
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motivation of saving money (GAO, 1996; Liska, 1997; Tobler & Gordon, 1996).
Against this stated primary goal is the other oft-cited objective, of using managed care
programs as a mechanism to ensure continued access to health care services for those
under the publicly funded Medicaid system. These two often countervailing goals of
access and cost-containment have been given differing labels by various states,
nonetheless both are consistently exposed as valuable, albeit essential. Both are
combined in the aim of social justice, the continued provision of increasingly costly
health care services to those who need them. This combined goal is neither always
easy nor clear to be able to reconcile. These goals may very well positively impact
the target population or greatly affect this target group adversely. As a state health
care financing director was quoted earlier, efficiencies "come from how you deliver
care and not how you pay for care" (Tobler & Gordon, L996, p. 65).
While persons with disabilities are the target population for Medicaid managed
care programs, other primary beneficiaries exist, namely the collective public, often
referred to as "the tax payers". While it is this ambiguous collective body whose
interest is espoused, state government officials and the private health plans they
contract with most often decide how access and cost-containment are reconciled.
Those Medicaid managed care programs for beneficiaries with disabilities that appear
to hold most promise also intimately involve beneficiaries and their advocates in
planning and program design through consensus-building community meetings
(Bodenheimer, 1997, GAO, 1996, Gold, 1997).
Under Karger and Stoesz's (1998) philosophical policy analysis framework,
feasibiliff is not examined as a haphazard afterthought, but rather, an essential
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component of analysis. "In order to do a thorough assessment, the analyst must
understand the relationship between the policy and external factors" (Karger &
Stoesz, 1998, p. 43). The policy is consistent with the current political pragmatism of
both federal and state governments (Tobler & Gordon, 1996). Public sentiment,
while necessary, may not exist in significant amounts either for or against this policy,
as it may not be seen as a large enough issue to directly affect a significant amount of
people (approximately only 68,000 Minnesotans) and will success or fail with little
public attention. With all that said, consumer and advocate participation has been
recognized as important to the success of Medicaid managed care programs for
persons with disabilities (Bodenheimer, 1997; GAO, 1996, Gold; 1997).
Economically, this policy is quite attainable. The primary purpose of this
policy is to contain health care spending. This is a consistent trend as govemments
seek to acquire added efficiencies and evaluate government spending more critically.
However, the question remains, will the decreased, capitated funding be adequate to
ensure quality and access to health care service for those with disabilities.
Administratively, this policy of Medicaid managed care appears quite feasible.
This policy has been viewed as quite effective, as opposed to the existing system that
had been described as unsustainable given the continued increasing costs (MN DHS,
1998b). This "cut and invest" strategy is consistent with a budget-neutral policy of
recouping potential health care cost through added managed care efficiencies.
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Considerations for Minnesota's Demonstration Project for People with Disabilities
Minnesota's program for serving Medicaid beneficiaries with disabilities
within a capitated managed care model (DPPD) appears to hold promise. The state
has started its foray into this relatively unproved arena with five small-scale projects.
With several slightly differing models, the state can see on a diminutive scale actions
which appear most effective prior to implementing a managed care program state-
wide, a step some states neglected with unintended results. While enrollment is
mandatory, the demonstration project has created many consumer protections and
safeguards, including an established network of consumer advocates working
independent of the demonstration projects. The state of Minnesota, from the onset,
constituted a system of information sharing and clarification through planning and
consensus-building community meetings with all relevant stakeholders: private health
plans, governmental entities, prospective enrollees, and consumer disability
advocates. Additionally, all Medicaid-covered acute and continuing care benefits
have been included within the scope of this managed care project, establishing a
coordinated continuum of care for beneficiaries enrolled in the project. A flexible
quality management system has been created using continuous qualify improvement
mechanisms, establishing a self-corrective system that embraces innovation and
adaptation to a "best practices" system of delivery.
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Further Recommendations for the Demonstration Project for People with Disabilities
D efl-ne Medical l.{ece s sit,v
The state of Minnesota, throughout the development and implementation of
DPPD, should include the maintenance of ones functionality in its definition of
"medically necessary" health care services when contracting with private health care
plans. Under a managed care system, funding mechanisms and service contracts
should include for the provision of maintenance or stabilizing medical and social
services, as well as, those which improve level of functioning, yet may not be
considered a medical procedure. Many such services county entities have provided,
yet are non-Medicaid reimbursable under the fee-for-service model or many managed
care arrangements. Robert Gabriele of the National Mental Health Association noted
that, "Definitions fail to include improvements in functional capability as a clinical
objective (or contain any reference to functional capability whatsoever). They seem
to preclude access to a wide array of essential services including supported housing,
psychosocial rehabilitation, day treatment, and other interventions." (Gabriel e, 1997 ,
p. 15). Not only would this allow for the least restrictive, and most independent
functioning level for the individual, also, home-based and community services are
often the most cost effective mode of service delivery. Dr. Gabriele (1997) cited a
study that found that in 98% of the time the determination of medical necessity is at
the health plans' discretion. Additionally, since no federal definition of medical
necessity exists, and that "medically necessary" criterion determines access to
services financed by Medicaid. The state of Minnesota should request that HCFA
consider developing a federal definition of "medical necessity".
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Adopt a System of Shared Financial Risk through a Risk Corridor
As stated above in the review of the literature, Minnesota's DHS has sought a
risk adjusted strategy that would protect the interests of both health plans and health
care recipients (MN DHS, 1998b). Risk corridors have been shown as the only
current risk-adjustment arrangement that limits both health plans' potential profits as
well as losses. Far more than a carve-out system, risk corridors provide incentives for
plans to serve individuals with high anticipated cost and service usage, such as those
populations with disabilities. Risk corridors, at the same time, diminish plans'
financial incentives to underserve or cream only healthier beneficiaries. Thus, by
creating a shared risk and shared benefit arrangement between private health plans
and the state of Minnesota should increase cooperation and shared purpose. Taking
this notion further, the creation of only one large "shared pool" amongst all
participating health plans would, by spreading financial benefits and losses to all,
promote cooperation in providing health care services to those with disabilities, rather
than competing for the healthiest beneficiaries. This large shared pool should
promote not only cooperation, but also interorganizational collaboration through
which increased service provision efficiencies would be found.
Use Inclusive Evaluation Research
The state of Minnesota has established a sound evaluation system to assess the
merits of DPPD. The underlying questions this evaluation is designed to answer are
"What works, for which people, under what conditions?" (MN DHS, 1997). Its stated
purpose is of "providing ongoing, timely information about the well-being of people
reseiving services". This proposed evaluative system has been described as a quasi-
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experimental longitudinal design measuring access to service, effectiveness and
satisfaction with services provided, as well as service costs and medical and quality of
life outcomes (MN DHS, 1997).
Review of the relevant literature has demonstrated that quite important in the
development of Medicaid managed care programs across the country has been
involving beneficiaries and their advocates into the program planning, design, and
oversight (GAO, 1996). The state of Minnesota has done an admirable job in
implementing this philosophy throughout DPPD; however, the project's evaluative
mechanisms appear to reflect a system of evaluation done of consumers by
professionals. It is recommended that the state adopt principles of empowerment
evaluation into their critical assessment of the impact and success of DPPD. The
concept of empowennent evaluation has largely been advanced by David M.
Fefferman and his colleagues. "Traditional evaluation methods contribute to
understanding (and perhaps improvement), with little emphasis on whether the
capacities of those studied are enhanced by the inquiry. By contrast, empowerment
evaluation offers the promise of using evaluation concepts and methods to promote
self-determination." (Fetterrnan, Kaftariatr, & Wandersman, 1998, p. 161-162). "The
aim of this evaluation is to build community competence; optimize community
outcomes; and promote adaptation, renewal, and institutionalization of community
health initiatives" (Fetterman, et al., 1998, p. 182).
The use of empowernent evaluation poses an important question, "'Whom
should the evaluation serve?" The state has suggested the DPPD serves as "an
important next step for our state and a great opportunity for us to improve services for
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people with disabilities" (Kolb, 1997). If so, then those with disabilities and their
advocates must be involved as true stakeholders, involved at all levels, including the
evaluation process.
Ensure Social Responsibility
As public health care officials contract with private health care providers, they
must insure that contracting organizations adapt their plans to adhere to the public's
common good, in addition to their own. Two Minnesota health care researchers,
Sheila Leatherman and l.{icole Lurie, have described a managed care system as
having the following attributes:
I ) Enrolls a representative segment of the general population living in the systems
geographic area;
2) Identifies and acts on opportunities for community health improvements;
3) Participates in community wide data networking and information;
4) Publishes information about its financial perforrnance and its contributions to the
community;
5) Includes the community, broadly defined, in the governance and advisory
structures of the managed care system;
6) Participates actively in health profession education programs;
7) Collaborates meaningfully with academic health centers, health departments, and
other components of the public health infrastructure;
8) Advocates publicly for community health prevention and disease prevention
policies. (Showstack, et al., 1996).
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It is recommended that the state of Minnesota mandate such principles with each
of its contracting partners. Moving beyond the private health plans' self-interest
towards the public's common good is essential for the state to ethically act in the
interest of the public. Additionally, this public-private partnership must be viewed as
a public trust and demonstrate its value to the community at large.
Limitations of the Study
This study has been limited by several factors. First, the promulgation of
Medicaid managed care programs has been a fairly recent phenomenon, with all but
one state program with no more than a decade of experience. Virtually no long-term,
longitudinal studies exist to ascertain the lasting impact of Medicaid managed care on
peoples lives. Little scholarly academic research has been done with regard to this
topic, those that do exist, either describe what a program is like, or anecdotally how
successful programs are, but little analysis exists systematically as to program
effectiveness or full impact. The topic for this analysis is quite limited in scope and
may be influenced by external factors outside the realm of analysis for this study.
Also, this analysis has been based upon current, yet evolving data, most notably
Medicaid financing structures and HCFA guidelines, which may change in the future
quite rapidly or drastically due to political externalities, i.e. as welfare entitlements
have. Private managed care plans have little experience providing services to persons
with severe disabilities, and as such, their involvement, willingness to provide
services may change soon in the fufure.
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Additionally, there are some possible countervailing legislation which exists
which may affect the implementation of future Medicaid managed care programs, as
of yet, have not been challenged in the courts and have unknown consequences. The
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (cited in Karger and Stoesz, 1998) has
provisions which ensure that people with disabilities have the same access and
opporfunities as non-disabled Medicaid enrollees. As such, the state may be required
to contract with the same health care providers for services for those beneficiaries
with disabilities as they currently do for non-disabled populations in PMAP. The
state may be bound to these health care plans regardless of the ability or dedication to
provide disability services. Additionally, provisions contained in the Balanced
Budget Act of 1997 which seek to prevent conflict of interest problems related to
county govemment entities becoming payers of health care services, providers of
services, and determiners of service eligibilify must be addressed more fully
(Richardson, 1998).
Recommendations for Future Research
Given several of the limitations listed immediately above, it may be redundant
to cite the need for continued and expanded research in this field is crucial. More
specifically, long-term studies in regard to effectiveness both in success of health
plans and service recipients must be done. Quantitative analysis of large amounts
outcome data is essential to gather what is most effective and most balanced for all
major stakeholders: health plan provider of services, governmental purchaser of
services, and individual recipient of services. Outcome measures should be
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scientifically sound and enrollee-centered focusing on clinical results, maintained
functioning, as well as, quality of life measures such as community integration,
independent living supports, and vocational outcomes. Data alone should not be the
ultimate goal, a system of self-correcting, continually improving services which
provide appropriate services most efficiently should be.
Implications for Social Policy
The public interest is served when the demands of social justice are met.
Health care is one component of the public interest under an umbrella of the common
good. Social justice dictates that health care should be established as a system that is
accessible to all. Social workers and those who share the profession's Code of Ethics
must seek to educate one another about the concerns of the most vulnerable, and that
is often those with disabilities. As Dr. Michael Kendrick deslares in his "Consumer
Centered Leadership Challenges": "The challenges for leaders is to articulate a set of
positive values that encourage the right human tendencies while challenging harmful
values, ideologies and even reflexes. All human conduct is value based, so the real
issue is seeking out and encouraging the values that have the greatest impact on
ensuring that people with disabilities are granted the humanity, dignity and respect
that everyone needs to live fully." (cited in Kolb, 1997).
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